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Abstract
We consider vertical contracts where the retail market may involve search
frictions. Minimum advertised price restrictions (MAP) act as a restraint on
customers’ information and so can increase search frictions in the retail sector.
Such restraints, thereby, soften retail competition—an impact also generated
by resale price maintenance (RPM). However, by accommodating (consumer
or retailer) heterogeneity, MAP can allow for higher manufacturer profits than
RPM. We show that they can do so through facilitating price discrimination
among consumers; encouraging service provision; and facilitating manufacturer
collusion. Thus, welfare effects may be positive or negative compared to RPM
or to the absence of such restrictions.
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1 Introduction
When a retailer enters into a distribution agreement with a manufacturer, it is well
understood that the agreement may impose ‘vertical’ restraints on the retailer that
restrict price or non-price aspects of retailer activity.1 Price restraints include resale
price maintenance (RPM), in which the manufacturer imposes floors and/or ceilings
in retail pricing. Commonly considered non-price restraints typically include exclu-
sivity provisions or the imposition of sales territories. This paper considers a form
of a third type of vertical restraint, information restraints: specifically, minimum
advertised price (MAP) policies.2 MAP policies impose a floor on the price at which
retailers can advertise a product, but, crucially, not the price at which it can be
sold to a consumer. That is, even if a MAP policy imposes a floor of $10 a unit on
advertised prices, nothing restricts the retailer from selling it to a consumer for $7.
MAP policies are a ubiquitous example of a broader set of restraints that restrict
the ability of retailers to communicate information to consumers. The reach and
impact of these restrictions may be significant. For instance, European Commission
(2017), reports on a survey of more than a thousand retailers engaged in ecommerce
across Europe, and suggests that a large fraction face non-price restrictions, includ-
1For a survey of common practices and the related economic issues, see Rey and Verge´ (2008).
2MAP policies appear the most common form of vertical information restraint. As an illus-
tration of the scope of their use, the first 40 policies found in a search for “minimum advertised
price pdf” using the Google search engine on April 13, 2016 covered the following product cate-
gories (companies): Adjustable office and industrial chairs (Neutral Posture); Antennas (Winegard
Company); Aquarium filtration systems (Lifegard Aquatics); Baby and toddler pillows (Smugg-
wugg); Batteries, flashlights, solar energy equipment (NOCO); Cameras, security cameras (Sony);
Chainstays, gripping bar tape (Lizard Skins); Chairs (Allseating); Clutches, flywheels, accessories
(Midway Industries); Data storage electronics (Seagate); Designer faucets, showers, and bath acces-
sories (Sonoma Forge); Digital display mounting (Ergotron); Enzymes (Enzyme Science); Exhaust
systems and muﬄers (Flowmaster); Games (Cool Mini or Not); Health bars, drinks, and powders
(Powercrunch); High-pressure hydraulic tools (Enerpac); Holster clips (Utiliclip); Home, mobile
and automobile electronics (JVC Professional Video Products); Instruments for measuring and cal-
ibrating (Meriam Process Technologies); LCD and plasma tvs (Microtek); Mobile cameras (GoPro);
Mobile telephone cases (Urban Armor Gear); Outerwear, corporate wear and imprintable apparel
(Charles River Apparel); Pistols (Glock); Rock-crawling and off-road cars (GMADE); Security
cameras and surveillance equipment (Samsung Techwin America); Scented pencils, stickers and
paper clips (Scentoco); Shallow water anchors (JL Marine Systems); Speakers (Eminence); Stove
ranges, broilers, ovens, kitcken equipment (Montague Company); Temperature-controlled food dis-
play cases (Structural Concepts); Thermal imaging infrared cameras (FLR Commercial Systems);
Toy car track tape (InRoad Toys and PlayTape); Triathalon clothing and gear (Pearl Izumi); Venti-
lation fans (Panasonic Home & Environment Co.); Wall art, picture frames, jewelry, mugs, pillows
(Glory Haus); Water bottles (Blender Bottle); Wood flooring (Kahrs International); Work boots
(Thorogood Shoes). All these policies are available at www.johnasker.com/MAP.zip.
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ing limitations to sell through market places (18%), websites other than their own
(11%), and the use of price comparison sites (9%). These kinds of restrictions can
be understood as making it more difficult for consumers to easily find products. In
this paper we focus on MAP restrictions as a lens through which to begin to explore
the economics of this class of restrictions.
At first sight, such restrictions seem odd. Advertising and information play an
important role in ensuring that customers know of the existence of a firm or product.
Price advertising can also reassure customers who are unsure about prices and so
might be put off from shopping. Thus there is clearly a role for advertising prices
and for a manufacturer to encourage retailers to do so whether to compete against
other brands or to mitigate consumer uncertainty. However, this intuition focuses on
the role of advertising in inter-brand competition. In this paper, we switch the focus
to competition between a manufacturer’s retailers (intra-brand competition) so as to
highlight the forces that may make restrictions on price advertising attractive for a
manufacturer.
Superficially, MAP and RPM policies appear similar.3 If an advertised price is
constrained to be equal to an actual price, then a MAP policy appears to operate as
de facto RPM. Indeed, as we discuss below, such a perspective appears to underlie
the thinking of antitrust agencies and commentators on policy. However, this view
of MAP, misses the crucial distinction between MAP and RPM, which is that the
MAP price does not restrict the retailer from offering an actual (transaction) price
at some level below the advertised price. We show that this distinction, and the
flexibility that the retailer retains therein, results in MAP having an economically
distinct effect on markets.
Two themes emerge. First, for MAP policies to have any market impact, con-
sumers need to have an informational (search) friction that advertising helps alle-
viate. Hence, in every setting we consider search frictions are a central feature. If
consumers can costlessly observe all product offerings, MAP is clearly irrelevant to
market outcomes.
Second, and of central economic interest, MAP policies soften competition by
obscuring prices. Thus, consumers allocate themselves to competitors somewhat
randomly or at least relying less on prices than they would if they were perfectly
informed. By contrast, RPM softens competition by equalizing prices (and by doing
so reducing the flexibility of retailers to respond to idiosyncratic conditions). When
consumers, or retailers, are heterogenous, MAP is helpful in retaining the flexibility
3There are models where these are equivalent. For example, consider the Diamond (1970)
model with homogeneous consumers; customers would anticipate that all firms would charge this
advertised ceiling of prices and so it acts as a minimum price restraint.
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to profitably accommodate heterogeneity. Thus, MAP will have an impact on mar-
kets when search and heterogeneity among similarly situated economic actors are
important features of the environment. By contrast, in these environments, RPM
tends to have more limited efficacy.
We illustrate these themes through a number of simple models. It is useful to
present several models so as to engage with the vast literature on RPM and the
variety of pro- and anti-competitive effects of RPM therein. (These were already
sufficient for a book-length treatment more than half a century ago. See Yamey,
1954). Rather than comparing MAP to RPM in every model of RPM that has been
introduced in the literature, we present three examples—one where RPM can play
no role; and two that show how MAP modifies canonical examples of the classic
pro- and anti-competitive roles of RPM: namely, encouraging service provision and
facilitating collusion. Specifically, these are:
• The price discrimination model: in which it is shown that MAP policies allow
manufacturers to imperfectly separate high and low search cost consumers,
and better extract surplus from high value consumers with high search costs.
That is, the MAP policy obscures actual prices, allowing search patterns to be
leveraged as a screening device.4
• The service model: in which it is shown that by obscuring prices, MAP poli-
cies soften competition and protect retailer profits, while allowing retailers to
optimize subject to their heterogenous marginal costs of retailing. This can in-
crease the returns to retailers from providing service that expands the market
(such as informative advertising). By softening competition, while retaining
retailer flexibility, MAP can dominate RPM as a means for manufacturers to
profitably incentivize retailers.5
• The collusion model: in which MAP raises cartel profits and stability by al-
lowing manufacturers to more easily monitor each other’s behavior. Notably
4Throughout we assume that retailers cannot price discriminate. Instead, discrimination occurs
through the consumers’ choice of retailer. Chen (1999) considers the effect of RPM when retailers
can engage in price discrimination. Although we do not consider it in this paper, MAP might
facilitate retailer price discrimination and, thereby, boost industry (and manufacturer) profits in
addition to retailers’ incentives to provide service.
5Telser (1960) is typically cited for the idea that RPM promotes service (though it is also
discussed in Yamey (1954), for example). More recent formalizations and developments include
Matthewson and Winter (1984); Klein and Murphy (1988); and Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997).
We follow the literature in considering pro-consumer service, although note that, as in the model
of exclusion in Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014), service need not be helpful to the consumer.
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this is done without sacrificing the ability of cartel members to tailor actual
transaction prices to local market conditions.6 That is, whereas RPM may be
viewed as having features of a price-fixing scheme, MAP may be viewed as
analogous to a market division scheme.
In antitrust policy, investigations and discussions of RPM, and by extension MAP,
tend to be focused on the last two models; that is, the tension between the service
provision and the facilitation of collusion.
In understanding the way MAP restrictions work, and in particular how they
differ from the price restraint embodied in an RPM restriction, it is useful to examine
a typical MAP provision. As an example, consider the January 1, 2016, MAP policy
of Samsung Techwin America (a manufacturer of security cameras and surveillance
equipment).7 The MAP price is specified as a percentage of the manufacturer’s
suggested retail price (in this instance, 40% of MSRP). The policy explicitly applies
to all advertisements in all media, including online. The MAP restriction only applies
to advertised prices and not to the price at which products are actually sold. In
physical stores, this means that the posted price in the store is not affected by the
MAP restriction. As regards online pricing, the policy states:
Pricing listed on an internet site is considered an “advertised price”
and must adhere to the MAP policy. Once the pricing is associated with
an actual purchase (an internet order), the price becomes the selling price
and is not bound by this MAP policy. Statements such as “we will match
any price”, and “call for price” are acceptable.
In particular, such policies allow retailers to advise customers that they will be
able to see the price when the item is in a (digital) shopping basket.
Lastly, Samsung reserves the right to punish non-compliance with termination.8
This paper contributes to the well established literature, in policy and academic
circles, on the antitrust implications of vertical contracts.9 Where MAP provisions
have been considered in this literature, the point of departure (as in this paper) has
6In formalizing this argument, we adapt the framework of Jullien and Rey (2007), developed to
consider RPM as facilitating upstream collusion, to accommodate MAP.
7Available at www.johnasker.com/MAP.zip
8Interestingly, the policy also describes its purpose, which in this instance is to “to help ensure
the legacy of STA as a top producer of high performance, high quality, professional security products
and to protect the reputation of its name and products ...[and]... to ensure dealers, retailers and
distributors have the incentive to invest resources into services for STA’s customers.”.
9See Rey and Verge´ (2008) for a survey.
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been RPM restrictions. As with many vertical restraints, the approach to MAP and
RPM taken in US and European law differs, with the E.U. being the less permissive.
In 2007 in the Leegin case federal U.S. law reversed earlier precedent, shifting RPM
from a complicated version of a per se offense to a rule of reason regime.10 Even
prior to the Leegin case, US law had ruled in favor of MAP provisions, acknowledging
their pro-competitive potential in preserving service incentives.11 Post-Leegin cases
in the U.S. have also failed to gain traction.
By contrast, in Europe, MAP provisions have tended to be viewed with more
suspicion. In particular, MAP has been found to be a de facto form of RPM.12 In
turn, RPM has been found to impose a sufficient degree of harm to competition that
there is no need to examine its effects in determining liability (that is, making it an
restriction of competition by object, somewhat similar to a per se offense in U.S.
law).13
Hence, jurisdictions differ in their approach to regulating MAP provisions. This
paper contributes to understanding this divergence by providing the precise frame-
works needed to make economic arguments supporting each approach. By doing so it
helps clarify the trade-offs implicit in arriving at any policy position vis-a-vis MAP.
This paper is also closely related to the nascent literature (notably Lubensky
(2014), Janssen and Shelegia (2015), and Janssen and Reshidi (2017)) that examines
the effects of vertical contracts when the final goods market is characterized by search
frictions. In particular, in such markets it has long been understood that the law of
10Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)
11See Holabird Sports Discounters v. Tennis Tutor, Inc, 1993 No. 92-2504, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10918, (4th Cir. May 7, 1993), and at appeal 993 F.2d 228 (1993) and Commodore Business
Machines, Inc. v. Montgomery Grant, Inc, No. 90 Civ. 7498 (LMM), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
262 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1993). In 2003, following on from an FTC enforcement action, plaintiffs
obtained a settlement in In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, 216
F.R.D. 197, 199-200 (D. Me.2003) (approving settlement) alleging that MAP provisions facilitated
a cartel among manufacturers (in this case, distributors of recorded music). Albert (2012) and
Passo (2016) provide extensive reviews of recent U.S. policy and litigation.
12See Commission Decision 16 July 2003 PO/Yamaha (COMP/37.975), OFT Decision Agree-
ments between Lladro Comercial SA and UK retailers fixing the price for porcelain and stoneware
figures, CP/0809-01, 31 March 2003 and, recently, the Decision of the UK Competition and Markets
Authority Online resale price maintenance in the commercial refrigeration sector Case CE/9856/14.
All these cases apply E.U. law. Hughes (2017) provides a broad discussion and criticism of the ap-
proaches of the UK Competition and Markets Authority and the EU Commission towards MAP
and RPM.
13See, for instance, the overview of relevant E.U. law in the Decision of the UK Competition and
Markets Authority Online resale price maintenance in the commercial refrigeration sector Case
CE/9856/14.
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one price need not hold, and price dispersion may arise.14 Naturally, such frictions
have implications for the contracts between manufacturer and retailer and for a
manufacturer’s profitability. A minimum advertised price restriction (MAP) which
limits the price that retailers may advertise (with no restriction on the price they may
charge) can make it more difficult for consumers to find the retailers charging the
lowest prices and lead to retail price dispersion (if not advertised price dispersion).
As is illustrated in this paper, a manufacturer (and even consumers) may benefit.
The paper is also related to the large and growing literature on obfuscation in
search markets. (See, for example, Ellison and Wolitzky (2012), Wilson (2010), Pic-
cione and Spiegler (2012), Chioveanu and Zhou (2013), Gamp (2016) and Petrikaite
(2016)).15 Much of the economic force of a MAP restriction is through making firms
identical from the point of view of consumers. In this way, MAP plays a role in
obfuscating the actual as opposed to advertised price (indeed this is its only role in
our analysis). This paper is distinct from the rest of the obfuscation literature (to
our knowledge) by explicitly considering the opportunities obfuscation gives to an
upstream manufacturer, as opposed to a retailer.
Only four papers, that we know of, consider MAP policies in the economic litera-
ture. Kali (1998) and Cetinkaya (2009) explore theoretical models that treat MAP as
an RPM provision with an additional advertising subsidy. A very different approach
is adopted in this paper. Charness and Chen (2002) conduct an experimental study
of the determinants of MAP compliance. Israeli, Anderson and Coughlan (forthcom-
ing) empirically examine detected violations of MAP, using data from a firm engaged,
on behalf of manufacturers, in monitoring MAP compliance of online retailers. They
also provide an informative discussion of MAP’s prevalence.16 Importantly for our
study, Israeli et al find that 14-22% of authorized dealers violate MAP, as compared
to 46-54% of unauthorized dealers. This suggests that MAP policies are genuine
restraints on retailer behavior.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the price dis-
crimination model and introduces some modeling structure that is used in the other
models. Section 3 investigates how MAP can enhance customer service. Section
4 shows how a MAP program can help coordinate a manufacturer cartel. Lastly,
14This idea goes back to Stigler (1961) at least. Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006) provide a
useful overview.
15More broadly, recent literature has explored retailers’ policies which influence search and pricing
behavior in search markets. Such practices include stochastic discounts off the list price in Gill
and Thanassoulis (forthcoming), lowest price guarantees in Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013), and
exploding offers in Armgstrong and Zhou (2016).
16The data used in Israeli et al comes from a firm offering MAP compliance monitoring of internet
based sellers.
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Section 5 offers some final remarks.
2 MAP as price discrimination
We begin by laying out a simple model. Its essential feature is the presence of
search frictions which imply that advertized prices might not reveal the actual prices
to consumers. We consider variations in the sections below to illustrate different
effects of MAP. In this section, we assume that consumers are heterogeneous both
in search costs and valuations. An advertising restriction allows the industry to
segment consumers and, thereby, raise profits. Welfare consequences, as is the case
with most price discrimination, are ambiguous.
2.1 Model
Consumers have unit demand for a good, which they can buy from one of two retail-
ers. Retailers source the good from a single manufacturer.
A fraction λ of consumers have a low valuation of the good, and derive utility
l − p when buying the good at price p; and the remainder have a high valuation, h
(we abuse notation slightly and also use l or h to denote the consumer’s type).
Minimum advertised prices only have bite if there are limits on the ability of
consumers to freely compare different retailers’ prices. We model these limits in a
simple way. Specifically, some fraction of consumers, σ, can search costlessly and
observe actual transaction prices. The remainder are assumed to be high-search
cost, such that they visit the store offering the lowest advertised price (equivalently,
highest advertised consumer surplus). If observing the same advertised price at both
retailers, they will choose one at random.17 That is, they have sufficiently high
search costs that they will only visit one store and, from the point of view of these
consumers, advertised prices are the only point of differentiation between retailers.
We write σ to denote the fraction of consumers in the whole population who search
both retailers, with the the remainder visiting only a single retailer (high search cost).
We write λS to denote the fraction of searchers who are low valuation consumers and
λN to denote the fraction of non-searchers who are low valuation consumers. It is
17Having high and low search cost consumers is an extreme but convenient, and often-used, way
to examine search frictions and consumers who are heterogeneous in their search behavior. See, for
example, Varian (1980). Alternatively, an ex-ante costly decision to engage in search in the style of
Burdett and Judd (1983) would allow the fraction of searchers to be endogenously determined (at
the cost of additional notation for these search costs, and a somewhat more involved analysis).
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immediate that MAP can play no role if σ = 1. Therefore, we assume that σ < 1.18
We also model consumers as non-strategic. That is, they act mechanically in
choosing the lowest (advertised) price. This rules out perverse behavior that may
arise from off-equilibrium beliefs regarding the signal content of advertised prices
being unrestricted in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Essentially, we assume that
consumers believe that a firm offering a lower advertised price offers more surplus
from a transaction.19
The two retailers are denoted R1 and R2. We suppose, in this section, that
they incur no costs beyond payments to the manufacturer. Later, in Section 3, we
allow the retailers to have positive, heterogeneous, marginal costs of retailing, but we
assume throughout that the manufacturer offers the retailers identical terms.20 These
retailers are indistinguishable to consumers other than through their advertising.
Retailers simultaneously set their prices, p1 and p2. We suppose truthful adver-
tising in the following sense: the advertising price can be no lower than the retail
transaction price pj, i.e. p
a
j ≥ pj.21 If the manufacturer imposes a minimum adver-
tised price restriction, pMAP , then paj ≥ max{pj, pMAP}. Combined with the model
of consumer behavior described above, this means that no firm has an advantage in
advertising a price higher than max{pj, pMAP}.22 As a result, the discussion that
follows explores the reduced form of this game and sets paj = max{pj, pMAP}.
Retailers buy the product from the manufacturer (M) according to a two-part
tariff with linear wholesale price w and fixed fee T .23 In the absence of vertical
restrictions, retailers take the wholesale price w as given and set the retail transaction
price and advertised price. If manufacturers impose RPM, retailers are bound to
charge at least the RPM price, pRPM (and it is assumed, without loss, that there is
no advertising restriction).24 If manufacturers impose MAP, retailers are bound to
advertise at the MAP price, pMAP , or higher as described above. The manufacturer’s
marginal cost is equal to zero.
18Indeed, to highlight the role of these non-searchers, in the service and collusions models we set
it equal to 0. That is, in these models, consumers only visit one store.
19The analysis in Appendix B shows how, even if consumers are strategic, this behavior can be
supported in equilibrium.
20This may be due to legal restrictions, or be induced by the timing assumptions below.
21There is a literature on false advertising. See Corts (2013,14), Rhodes and Wilson (2016) and
Piccolo, Tedeschi, and Ursino (2015) for recent contributions.
22The reasoning mirrors that of the standard homogenous good Bertrand model.
23Since we assume that the manufacturer cannot distinguish between retailers, there are no
subscripts on these variables to denote different retailers.
24That is, we consider minimum RPM.
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2.1.1 Timing
Timing is as follows.
1. The manufacturer sets the contract terms (T,w) and any restraints (RPM,
MAP etc. and the associated prices pRPM or pMAP ).
2. Retailers accept or reject the offered contract.
3. Retailers each set their price, pj. The advertised price is pj or, if a MAP
restriction is in place, max{pj, pMAP}, where pMAP is the minimum advertised
price.
4. Given the advertised or actual prices that they observe, consumers sort into
exploring purchases from R1 or R2. In particular, they choose to visit the
retailer where they expect lower price, as long as the expected surplus is non-
negative. If indifferent, consumers are equally likely to visit either retailer.
5. Purchases are made and profits realized.
In this model, since there is no relevant private information, the relevant notion
of equilibrium is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Analysis
We show that MAP can facilitate price discrimination. That is, in the face of con-
sumer preference heterogeneity, MAP can be used to sort consumers among retailers
in ways that extract greater surplus than might otherwise be the case. This is be-
cause MAP by preventing all consumers from searching amongst retailers costlessly
can allow for price dispersion. As noted by Salop (1977), an integrated monopolist
would value such price dispersion as it both segments the market and charges higher
prices to less efficient searchers. An appropriate MAP contract enables the manu-
facturer both to allow for such price dispersion, and to extract the surplus that this
creates in the industry as a whole.
With a two part-tariff, it is immediate that even without the use of vertical
restraints, the manufacturer can induce a retail price of h or a retailer price of l and
enjoy the full surplus of doing so.25 If industry profit is maximized by selling to all
consumers at p = l, by setting w = l, the manufacturer can induce retailers who
25As is well understood, the use of a two-part rather than linear tariff allows the manufacturer
to overcome the familiar double-marginalization problem highlighted in Spengler (1950).
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Bertrand compete to set prices at p = l. This extracts all the retailer surplus, and
the manufacturer sets T = 0. Conversely, if industry profit is maximized by selling
to only high value consumers, all surplus can be extracted by the manufacturer (for
example, by setting p = h and T = 0). Thus, the manufacturer’s profit is equal to
max {l, (1− λ)h}.
Note that RPM does not provide an avenue through which to raise profits above
this level. Setting pRPM > w provides a binding price floor on the retailers’ prices,
since they are in homogenous bertrand competition. However this does not aid in
surplus extraction.
However, the addition of MAP to this environment may allow for further surplus
extraction by the manufacturer. It does so by inducing the different retailers to
charge different prices (it is clear that optimally, in this simple environment one will
charge a price l and the other a price h). When one retailer prices high and the other
low, consumers with a high valuation and high search costs will purchase from the
high price store if they are randomly allocated to that store. Consumer with zero
search costs, or the luckier high valuation consumers will purchase from the low price
store.
We begin by characterizing the optimal MAP-based discriminatory scheme for the
case where λs = 1 (no high value consumers search).
26 We then illustrate, through a
simple example, that such a MAP policy can bring the manufacturer strictly greater
profits than can be achieved in the absence of MAP.
Proposition 1 When λs = 1, in the optimal MAP-based discriminatory price scheme
the manufacturer sets (w∗, T ∗) as in Equations (1) and (2)
w∗ =
(1 + σ)l − h(1− σ)(1− λN)





2σ + (1− σ)λN (2)
and the MAP price is set at or above h. R1 sets p = l and R2 sets p = h.
27 Under







26λs = 1 for expositional ease. This characterization is used later in the section to construct
examples and illustrative cases. Asker and Bar-Isaac (2016) provide a characterization of the
scheme with λs ≤ 1 and heterogeneity in the marginal costs of retailing.
27Of course, there is another equilibrium in which R2 sets p = l and R1 sets p = h Allowing for
heterogeneity in retailers’ costs is a simple means of extending the model to resolve a coordination
issue in selecting roles in these asymmetric equilibria.
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Proof. Given that R1 sets a price of l, R2 must prefer setting a price of h and selling
to half of the high value non-searchers (of whom there are (1 − λN)(1 − σ)) who
randomly visit R2 to setting a price just below l and selling to all searchers as well










Similarly, R1 must prefer to set a price of l rather than one just below h when





(l − w∗) ≥ (1− σ)(1− λN)
2
(h− w∗). (4)
These inequalities are both satisfied when they hold with equality, yielding the
expression for w∗, where both retailers earn the same profits (net of the fixed fee).
The manufacturer sets the fixed fee T ∗ to extract this profit.
The manufacturer profits come from collecting T ∗ from each of the two retailers,
and a margin of w∗ on every unit sold, where sales are from all consumers apart
from a fraction (1−σ)λN
2
corresponding to high value consumers who do not search
and randomly find themselves at the firm charging a high price.
With λs = 1, a MAP-based scheme as described in Proposition 1 can be sustained
for retailers that are identical.28 When λs < 1 an extra term is added in the right-
hand-side of equation 4 for the high value searches that are captured by a price just
below a price of h. As a result of this, if λs < 1, both inequalities can not hold in
the proof above. This indicates that, for a MAP scheme to exist when some high
value consumers search, there needs to be some heterogeneity in the marginal costs
of retailing across retailers. When this is present, the low cost retailer prices low, and
the high cost retailer prices high. That is, the retailers coordinate pricing according
to their relative marginal costs.
We illustrate the optimality (over a subset of the parameter space) of the MAP-
based discriminatory scheme with a transparent example in which λS = 1 and
λN = 0, such that all low value consumers costlessly search both retailers, and
the high value consumers will only visit one retailer. This is intentionally stark; the
discriminatory scheme can be sustained without such perfect negative correlation
between valuations and the fraction of searchers.
28Kaplan and Menzio (2016) provide empirical support for an assumption that searchers are more
likely to have low valuations than non-searchers. Proposition 1 is expressed leveraging an extreme
version of such a view.
11










Consider the profit that a manufacturer that sets the MAP price at pMAP = h can
extract. It is clear that for MAP to be strictly profitable, it must lead one retailer
(denoted RH) to charge a retail price equal to h and the other, RL, to set the retail
price to l.
Figure 1 illustrates this scenario with λ = 0.5. Of the high value consumers, due
to the identical advertised price imposed by MAP and their inability to search, half
go to RH and half to RL. All the low value consumers (who are assumed to be able




(h−w)(1− λ), the sum of rectangles A and B. Similarly, the profit made
by RL is (l − w)(λ + (1 − λ)12), the diagonally hatched rectangle corresponding to
the sum of C and D. By setting w such that the two profits are equal, then using T ,
the manufacturer can capture all the surplus other than area E.
It is easy to find parameterizations such that this equilibrium exists and this
discriminatory pricing policy is optimal for the manufacturer, as shown in Example
1, below.
Example 1 Let λS = 1 and λN = 0, h = 2, l = 1 and σ = 0.5. Following




) and pMAP = 2. Further, the manufacturers profit
from this pricing scheme is 1.25. The maximal profit from a two part tariff, absent
MAP, is 1. Thus, the MAP policy, in this example, leads to strictly greater profit for
the manufacturer.
All price discrimination operates by (usually imperfectly) homogenizing con-
12
sumers so that targeted prices extract more surplus.29 The MAP policies explored
here are no exception. By introducing an information friction, the manufacturer is
able to isolate at least some of the high value consumers and extract surplus from
them via the high price charged by RH . By contrast, RPM does little to segregate
consumers and so, here, would serve only to solve a possible double margin problem
(which arises if T is restricted to 0). This illustrates the sense in which MAP has
elements analogous to the much more invidious market division schemes that invite
criminal sanction under antitrust laws, while RPM is similarly analogous to price
fixing.30 Merely agreeing on a common price does not help retailers, in this setting,
to extract more surplus. However, if retailers could allocate high value consumers to
R2 and low value consumers to R1, as might be done in some ideal market division
scheme, then they would be able to extract all available gains from trade. MAP
generates an imperfect implementation along these lines, albeit ultimately to the
benefit of the upstream manufacturer.31
As is standard for price discrimination, welfare consequences are ambiguous and
depend on quantity effects. If in the absence of MAP, the optimal scheme involves a
retail price of h that excludes l-consumers then MAP would raise welfare; instead if
the unrestricted case involved a price of l and sales to all customers then the MAP
scheme (in which not all h-type consumers are served) would reduce it.
2.3 Price discrimination and simple service
We extend the model in Section 2, to allow for service in a simple way. Here,
we suppose that service is a discrete choice: either a retailer provides it or not.32
Moreover, both retailers need to provide service for demand to be non-zero.33 Thus,
the timing in Section 2.1.1 is extended so that at stage 3, retailers also have a decision
of whether to incur a fixed cost F to undertake service. It is noteworthy that this
service consideration implies that MAP may be optimal for the manufacturer even
29Sometimes the emphasis is tilted toward better targeting the prices (in the extreme, Type 1
price discrimination), while other times the emphasis is on homogenizing the consumers (bundling,
and Type 3 price discrimination, being obvious examples).
30To be clear, we do not argue that MAP and RPM should invite the same sanctions as market
division and price fixing. Indeed, as much of this paper shows, both often serve to make markets
more efficient and more consumer friendly.
31Interestingly, contingent on IC constraints being satisfied, as more retailers are used in a market,
surplus extraction via MAP will approach perfect (type 1) price discrimination in this setting.
32This could correspond, for example, to a fixed cost to participate in the market.
33This is an (extreme) way of capturing the free-riding effect explored in Matthewson and Winter
(1984) and many subsequent papers.
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when the manufacturer is restricted to linear tariffs.34
In this model of discrete service provision, where both retailers must be active,
the market breaks down in the absence of vertical restrictions. This is due to the
Bertrand competition between the retailers – at least one retailer will earn zero
profits, before any fixed costs are deducted, and hence, anticipating this outcome,
retailers have no incentive to provide service at cost F > 0.35 As a result, there is
no demand for the product, and the product is not offered to the market.
Figure 2: Service with MAP and RPM
(a) Service with MAP (b) Service with RPM when pRPM=h (c) Service with RPM when pRPM=l 
Notes cL=cH=0, σl=1 and σh=0. 
Panel (a) of Figure 2 illustrates how a price discrimination-based MAP program
can be used to generate service. Building on the model illustrated in Figure 1, Panel
(a) shows that, rather than capturing surplus using the lump-sum part of a two part
tariff, the manufacturer may leave surplus with the retailers and the retailers can use
this to fund service. That is, when the wholesale unit price is wMAP , the rectangles
with area F will be sufficient to provide service. The profit to the manufacturer in
Panel (a) is equal to wMAP . Note that all customers get served and some consumer
surplus is generated for those high value consumers that find the low price retailer.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 illustrates the outcome when pRPM = h. Given a cost of
service F , the optimal wholesale unit price is equal to wMAP . This is easy to see, once
it is noted that the rectangles F in Panel (b) must be the same size as the rectangle
34This is immediate, if for example it happens to be that F = T ∗(w∗) where T ∗(w∗) is as
characterized in Proposition 1; but, of course, is true much more generally. Conversely, if F = 0
and the manufacturer is restricted to linear tariffs, it can be shown that the manufacturer would
never gain through the use of a MAP restriction.
35This will be true even if retailers have positive and different (constant) marginal costs of retail-
ing.
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F in Panel (a).36 The key difference between Panel (b) and Panel (a) is that, while
service is provided in both instances, in Panel (b) a quantity distortion exists. This
is, by virtue of MAP allowing more effective price discrimination, more consumers
are served under MAP than RPM. Further, some consumer surplus is generated
under MAP, but not when using RPM. Finally, the profit of the manufacturer using
RPM is half that obtained when using MAP (w is the same, but half the consumers
are served). Thus, MAP dominates RPM for both consumers and the manufacturer,
despite the fact that service is provided under both policies.
Panel (c) shows what happens when the optimal RPM policy is pRPM = l.37 Note
that wRPM < wMAP , since, under RPM, the retailers are sharing the entire market
at the low price: this means consumers have more surplus, and to give the retailer
sufficient rents to fund service, the manufacturer has to drop the wholesale unit price.
Thus, consumers are better off under RPM, service is provided under both RPM and
MAP, and no distortions exist. It still remains that, since wMAP > wRPM , the MAP
policy is the more profitable way for the manufacturer to provide service.
The dominance, from the point of view of the manufacturer, of MAP policies as
a way to incentivize service is not surprising, as it has been already established that,
in this setting, MAP is a superior method of surplus extraction. What is perhaps
more notable, is that when gains from trade are ‘low’, consumers also prefer MAP
policies to RPM, as MAP does not generate a quantity restriction.38
We end by providing a parametrized example in which the possibility results and
intuitions provided in this section are easily verified.
Example 2 Let λS = 1, λN = 0, h = 1+, l =  and λ = 0.5. Let F =
3
8
. For  < 1
2
,
neither RPM nor MAP will provide sufficient surplus to retailers to induce them to





optimal RPM price is h, w = h− 4F and service is provided, but only the high value
consumers are served and a deadweight loss exists. By contrast, with a MAP policy
in which pMAP = h and w = h − 4F , all consumers are served, and no deadweight
loss occurs. Further, half the high value consumers receive some consumer surplus.
For  > 1, there is no deadweight loss under either MAP or RPM, service is provided
and RPM generates the greater consumer surplus (pRPM = l). For any  > 1
2
the
manufacturer’s profits from MAP will be strictly higher than that using RPM.
36It is also immediate from this observation that, in this model, if service can be provided under
MAP, there exists an RPM policy that will also induce service.
37This will occur after some point as h and l are increased by the same additive constant.
38That is, when pRPM = h.
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3 MAP and service provision
In this section, we develop the idea that a service component might lead a MAP
arrangement to be optimal, independently of the usefulness of MAP as a price dis-
crimination device (as in Section 2.3).
We focus on retailer cost heterogeneity, and suppose that consumers are homo-
geneous. This shuts down price discrimination. To further homogenize consumers,
and to highlight the role of search costs, we set σ = 0. That is, all consumers have
high costs of search and so visit only one store. As above, the goods sold at the
different stores are homogeneous. The model is enriched, such that consumers have
downward-sloping, rather than unit, demand, with each consumer’s demand given by
q(p).39 This means that retailers with different marginal costs have different optimal
retail prices.
On the retailer side, we enrich the scope of service at stage 3 in the timing of
the core model described in Section 2.1.1. Specifically, retailer j sets a service level
sj ∈ [0, 1] at cost I(sj), which is continuously differentiable and increasing and I ′(s) is
sufficiently high that equilibrium investments are strictly less than 1. Thus, service
is now a continuous choice variable for each retailer. It acts to increase consumer
awareness of the product.40 A consumer that is aware of the product can purchase
from either retailer, as in Matthewson and Winter (1984). An investment of sj will
expose a measure of consumers of size sj to the product. The probability that a
consumer is exposed to the investment of one retailer is independent of whether it
is exposed to the other, so the total measure of consumers that are aware of the
product is equal to S = 1− (1− s1)(1− s2).
Finally, we suppose that each retailer’s marginal cost of retailing is independently
drawn from an ex ante known distribution. This marginal cost takes the value cH with
probability α, and is cL = 0 otherwise. Retailer costs remain private information;
that is, retailers do not know each others’ realizations.41 Further, this implies that
the relevant equilibrium concept in this section is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We
suppose that retailers’ cost are realized only after entering into contracts with the
manufacturer; that is, after stage 2 and before stage 3 in the timing of Section 2.1.1.
Hence, the two-part tariff extracts surplus by setting the fixed fee equal to a retailer’s
39q′(p) ∈ (−∞, 0), q′′(p) ∈ [0,∞).
40As pointed out in Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014) service need not be pro-competitive, and (at least
in their model) can lead to exclusion when retailers are gatekeepers to a market. All the arguments
made in Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014) can be transferred to environments with MAP.
41At a technical level, this provides ex post price dispersion, which is needed for RPM and MAP
to have a meaningful role.
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expected net profit.42
This model shows how MAP can lead to pro-competitive service when the price
discrimination channel outlined above is not operative. That is, the focus is shifted
from MAP’s efficacy in leveraging consumer heterogeneity, to its efficacy in environ-
ments dominated by retailer heterogeneity.
3.1 No vertical restrictions




Sq(p1)(p1 − w − c1) if p1 < p2
1
2
Sq(p1)(p1 − w − c1) if p1 = p2
0 if p1 > p2
(5)
Profit for R2 is similarly defined.
In considering the equilibrium of the pricing subgame (stage 3 in the timing in
Section 2.1.1), note that this is a discrete analog to Spulber (1995) which points out
that Bertrand with privately known costs mirrors the equilibrium in a first price auc-
tion with risk aversion. Equilibrium of the pricing subgame then follows Proposition
2 in Spulber (1995) which is, itself, an adaptation of Theorem 2 in Maskin and Riley
(1984). Equilibrium pricing is characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium pricing strategy such
that, for j ∈ {1, 2}:
1. if cj = cH , pH = w + cH
2. if cj = 0, price (pL) is drawn from the distribution FL(p) =
(p−w)q(p)−α(p−w)q(p)
(1−α)(p−w)q(p)
with the support [p, p), where p = min{pH , pML (w)} and pML is the monopoly
price a low cost retailer would charge; i.e. pML = arg max(p− w)q(p); and p is
implicitly defined by q(p)
(
p− w) = α(p− w)q(p).
Proof. See the appendix.
Next, we proceed by backward induction to consider the equilibrium of the in-
vestment subgame. Attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria where a retailer
with a low cost realization chooses an interior investment sL > 0. Note that given
42This is implied by the timing in Section 2.1.
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the pricing equilibrium in Proposition 2; it is immediate that a high cost retailer
earns no (net of investment) profits and, therefore, that there is no investment at a
high cost realization; that is, sH = 0.





where E(S) = 1 − (1 − s1)(1 − αsH − (1− α) sL) = 1 − (1 − s1)(1 − (1− α) sL)
and p˜i(cL) = α(p− w)q(p) (note, by construction, in the mixed strategy equilibrium
profits adjusted by the probability of winning is constant over p). This yields the
following best response function in the investment subgame that arises from the first
order condition:
I ′(s1(cL)) = (1− (1− α) sL)α(p− w)q(p). (7)
By imposing symmetry, the equilibrium advertising levels are implicitly defined as
follows:43
I ′(sL) = (1− (1− α) sL)α(p− w)q(p). (8)
Finally, we can turn to the problem of the manufacturer. The manufacturer sets
T equal to a retailer’s expected profits so that
T = (1− α) [(1− (1− sL)(1− (1− α) sL))α(p− w)q(p)− I(sL)] ,
where this expression follows on noting that only the low cost retailer earns prof-
its and expected size of market and expected profits per customer follow from the












where the term in square brackets corresponds to expected sales. To understand this
term, first note that when both retailers have high costs then there is no investment
in advertising and so there are no sales; with probability 2α(1− α) there is just one




q(p)fL(p)dp in expectation; finally, the second term inside the square
brackets describes the event in which both retailers get low cost realizations. When
both retailers are low cost, consumers aware of the product will purchase from the







lower of two price drawn independently from FL(.); thus, the final integral reflects
the expected quantity corresponding to a price distributed as the second order static
of FL(.).
3.2 RPM
From the perspective of the manufacturer, resale price maintenance can strictly im-
prove on the outcome with no restraints. The channels that allow this are standard.
First, minimum RPM can soften price competition between retailers, and hence, by
allowing the retailers higher expected profits, can induce greater investment. For
example, consider the case where α is close to 0, so that both retailers are almost
certainly low cost retailers. Retailer (net) profits, and hence advertising investments,
would be negligible. In this case, a RPM provision that guaranteed retailers some
net profits and induced some investment would clearly help induce service. Second,
retail prices (for retailers with low cost realizations) may be too high due to a stan-
dard double mark-up problem; maximum RPM can help solve this. Here, the focus
is on the case of a binding minimum RPM, set at a level denoted by P , reflecting
the need for service.44
First, note that if minimum RPM is binding for both high and low cost retailers,
the retail price (regardless of the retailers’ cost realizations) is given by P . Instead,
if the restriction is binding only for retailers with low cost realizations, then the
pricing equilibrium will, again, involve a mixed strategy for any retailer with a low
cost realization. In order to characterize it, it is useful to define an upper limit for
the support of the mixing distribution as follows:
pmin = min{cH + w, pML (w)}.
Then the pricing equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the minimum RPM price is P < w + cH (so that it
does not bind given a high cost realization) but binds given the low cost realization,
there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium pricing strategy such that for j ∈ {1, 2}:
1. if cj = cH , pH = w + cH ;
2. if cj = 0, and pmin < pmin then price, pL, is drawn from the distribution
FminP (p) with support P ∪ (pmin, pmin) and an atom at P where
44While the double margin issues are not the primary focus, it should be noted that the problem
is limited by pH = w + cH .
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(a) p < pmin, FminP (p) is characterized by α(pmin − w)q(pmin) = q(p)(p −
w)(α + (1− α)(1− FminP (p))
(b) p
min
is implicitly defined by q(P )(P − w)
[
α + (1− α)FminP (pmin)
2







3. if cj = 0, and pmin ≥ pmin then pL = P with probability 1.
Proof. See the appendix.
The characterization of the pricing equilibrium suggests that in case the optimal
minimum RPM induces price dispersion, it cannot aid the manufacturer through
inducing service provision.45
Corollary 1 Suppose that the minimum RPM price is P < w + cH (so that it does
not bind given a high cost realization) and that a low cost retailer plays a mixed
strategy in pricing, then the level of investment in service is identical to the level of
investment in the absence of RPM or any other restrictions—that is the solution to
(6).
Proof. This is immediate on noting that a retailer with a high cost realization
makes no net profits and that pmin = p so that a retailer’s profit per aware consumer
is identical to the case of no restrictions. Thus, the low cost retailer faces the identical
maximization problem (6) in its choice of investment in service.
It follows that RPM can only play a role in inducing service provision in one
of two cases (i) either it binds for both low and high cost realizations; that is, if
P > w + cH ; or (ii) it leads a firm with a low cost realization to choose P with
certainty (which requires p
min
> pmin as defined in Proposition 3). We provide a
complete characterization of the manufacturer’s problem with RPM, analogous to
our analysis of the case with no restrictions, above, in Appendix B. Here, it is worth
noting that in the former case, where both high and low cost firms set a price equal




for low cost and high cost realization can be easily implicitly characterized through
45Interestingly, minimum RPM (and not only maximum RPM) can play a role in affecting “double
mark-up” concerns by changing the price distribution and so may still dominate no restriction from
the manufacturer’s perspective even if it has no impact on service provision.
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the first order conditions as follows:
I ′(sL(P )) = (1− αsH − (1− α) sL)q(P )
2
(P − w), and (9)
I ′(sH(P )) = (1− αsH − (1− α) sL)q(P )
2
(P − w − cH). (10)
Note that these equations must be satisfied simultaneously; in comparison, in the
case of no restrictions solving for a high cost retailer’s investment is trivial which
allows for a simple characterization of a low cost retailer’s investment in (7). In
particular, here, investment by the high cost and low cost retailers are strategic
substitutes.46
It is straightforward to find instances where the manufacturer might benefit from
imposing such a price restriction; in particular, this will be the case for α close to 0
or 1.
Summarizing the discussion above, we obtain Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Minimum RPM set at P can strictly improve the manufacturer’s
profits relative to the case of no restrictions in the case of smooth service investments.
It can only do so through raising retailers’ advertising investments when it leads
retailers to choose pure pricing strategies.
Proof. See the appendix.
3.3 MAP
MAP can have the benefit of the minimum RPM scheme described above in dulling
competition between retailers and allowing them higher profits, thereby encouraging
investment in advertising. However, MAP has the benefit that it allows some retailers
to drop actual price below the advertised minimum. The reason that they may want
to do this is that their monopoly price may be below the MAP price. Moreover, this
can be in the interest of the manufacturer as it increases the sales per customer for
customers who are aware relative to the minimum RPM policy, and can increase the
low cost retailer’s level of investment and the overall number of customers aware of
the product.
Specifically, MAP at the MAP price P plays a role that might be different from
RPM when the high cost retailer charges this price, and the low cost retailer charges
46For specific parameterizations unique closed form solutions are assured. For example, for
quadratic investment costs I(s) = s
2
2 , sL(P ) =
(P−w)q(P )









Under MAP, half of the consumers who are aware of the good purchase from either
retailer (irrespective of its costs), since the retailers advertise the same price. These
consumers then respond to the price that they observe at the retailer. Consequently,
service for low cost and high cost realization can be easily implicitly characterized
through the first order conditions as follows:48
I ′(sL(P )) = (1− αsH − (1− α) sL)q(p
m(w))
2
(pm(w)− w), and (11)
I ′(sH(P )) = (1− αsH − (1− α) sL)q(P )
2
(P − w − cH). (12)
These differ from the equations that characterize investment under RPM at the
same price P , in (9) and (10) since the low cost retailer sells at a price pm(w) rather
than P and sells q(pm(w)) to each consumer who arrives at the retailer rather than
q(P ). Given that retailers’ investments are strategic substitutes, this affects the
equilibrium investments of both retailers. Thus, although greater investment from
a low cost retailer might be anticipated as a result of the imposition of MAP, a
consequence would be a force that dampens a high cost retailer’s investment. As
for the case of no restrictions, the manufacturer optimally T equal to a retailer’s
expected profits and chooses w to maximize expected profits. A formal treatment
can be found in Appendix B.
We argue that the different economics of MAP as compared to RPM, by allowing
the low cost retailer to charge a lower price than the MAP price, lead to higher
industry profits and more effective investments. We do so both by example and in
the Proposition below.
Proposition 5 In the case of smooth service investments, MAP can earn the man-
ufacturer strictly higher profits than minimum RPM. When investment costs are
sufficiently convex or if the firm is unlikely to be low cost (α is high enough), then
MAP can never earn less than minimum RPM.
47At a sufficiently high MAP price, both a high cost retailer and a low cost retailer would charge
a lower price than the MAP price. However, since a high cost retailer’s price can be predicted—it
is simply its monopoly price (given w)—the manufacturer could set the MAP price at this level.
Consequently, it is without loss of generality to suppose that the MAP price is always binding for
a high cost retailer in equilibrium. For expositional simplicity we assume P ≤ pMH (w).
48For example, with quadratic investment costs I(s) = s
2
2 , a unique closed form solution is
assured. Specifically, sL(P ) =
(P−w)q(P )




Proof. Suppose that the optimal RPM involves a two-part tariff (T,w) and the
level of the price minimum at P . Rather than considering the optimal MAP scheme,
suppose that MAP is imposed at P and with a wholesale price of w, it is immediate
that a retailer with a high cost realization would choose a retail price equal to P .
However, it is possible that the monopoly price for a retailer with a low cost real-
ization is below P . In this case, under MAP, a retailer with a low cost realization
would charge this monopoly price pmL (w) = arg max(p− w)q(p) < P .
This potentially affects M ’s profits in several ways:
First, through sales directly, by increasing the sales per aware consumer (since a
low cost retailer charges a lower price). Secondly, it affects sales by changing retailers’
investments: Holding fixed the service level of a high cost retailer, it is clear that
a lower cost retailer would invest more. However, the higher investment of a low
cost retailer reduces a high cost retailer’s gains from investment, as discussed below
Equation (12). Overall, the combined effect is ambiguous. With sufficiently convex
costs (or high α), the effects on the low cost retailer’s investment is negligible leading
to a positive overall effect on profits.
Finally, there is an effect through a (potentially) higher fixed fee TMAP which
might also reflect different service levels and so, in principle, the sign of the effect
might be ambiguous. Again, when the investment cost function is sufficiently convex
or α high enough, the impact on service levels is small, so that this effect is also
positive. Thus, overall M ’s profits rise.
Finally, to easily observe that it indeed possible to have pmL (w) < P and, thereby,




It is worth noting that MAP may under-perform RPM from the perspective of the
manufacturer. This is (trivially) the case when all consumers can search costlessly
(σl = σh = 1) and MAP serves no useful function.
That said, the earlier Example 2 and Example 3, below, which provides a nu-
merical counterpoint to Proposition 5, make it clear that settings do exist in which,
by allowing for greater investment in efficient service and simultaneously allowing
more sales to realized, MAP can be pro-competitive (whether judged on a consumer
surplus or total surplus criterion).
Example 3 Let q(p) = 1 − p, α = 0.9 and cH = 0.4. Table 1 shows the charac-
teristics of the optimal polices in the no restrictions, RPM and MAP cases. MAP
generates the highest consumer and total surplus, and the highest expected manufac-
turer and retailer profits.49
49Matlab code for generating the results in Table 1 can be found at
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Table 1: Results for example 3: α = 0.9, cH = 0.4, q(p) = 1− p
No restrictions RPM MAP
Manufacturer expected profits 0.0057 0.0077 0.0084
Retail expected profits 0.0020 0.0039 0.0041
Low cost R profits 0.0203 0.0109 0.0125
High cost R profits 0 0.0031 0.0032
P - 0.6723 0.7000
w 0.0805 0 0
sL 0.1836 0.1048 0.1140
sH 0 0.0424 0.0428
Consumer Surplus 0.0061 0.0051 0.0065
Total Surplus 0.0159 0.0205 0.0231
4 MAP and collusion
Vertical restrictions, and RPM in particular, have long been regarded as potentially
collusive mechanisms. That is, the binding of retailers, by the manufacturer, to a
common price, can look, at first glance, like a price fixing agreement.50 In the modern
era, the concern that RPM facilitates collusion continues to shape policy, supported
by research, most notably the central contribution of Jullien and Rey (2007).51 Jul-
lien and Rey (2007) demonstrate that RPM facilitates collusion by making deviations
more transparent, at the cost of reducing responsiveness to local idiosyncratic de-
mand fluctuations.52,53 In the analysis below, it is shown that MAP can similarly
soften competition, again by inducing demand patterns akin to a market division
www.johnasker.com/MAPservice.zip
50See Overstreet (1983) for a comprehensive historical survey.
51Jullien and Rey (2007) provide a formal foundation for ideas that have existed, albeit in only
heuristic form, since at least Telser (1960) and Yamey (1954).
52Julien and Rey (2007) note other elements of the tradeoff, notably that RPM can make pun-
ishment more severe.
53In a recent paper Sugaya and Wolitzky (2016) highlight that even costless transparency might
not always be beneficial for sustaining a cartel; although in many standard settings it is.
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scheme, without reducing responsiveness to local market demand fluctuations. This
results in MAP facilitating a more profitable and stable cartel.
The idea can been seen heuristically in the following simple example. Two man-
ufacturers sell to a market via dedicated (non-shared) retailers. Consider a market
in which there is always a high value consumer who would pay h. In addition,
with probability µ, there is an additional consumer who has a low valuation l. This
additional consumer is local to one of the two manufacturers’ retailers (with equal
probability). That is with probability 1−µ there is only a high value consumer, and
with probability (µ/2) there is also a low value consumer available to manufacturer
1 and with probability (µ/2) a low value consumer available to manufacturer 2. Sup-
pose that 2l > h so that if a low value consumer is available, the industry would earn
higher profits by selling to both consumers than to the high value consumer alone.54
Jullien and Rey (2007) argue that RPM allows the manufacturers to more easily
monitor compliance with a collusive scheme at the cost of less responsiveness to
demand (or cost shocks). In the simple environment outlined above, RPM does
not help manufacturers collude (with this simple unit demand specification, the
manufacturers can agree on a common (high) retail price by setting w1 = w2 = h),
and observing retail prices allows manufacturers to monitor their compliance with
this scheme. MAP accommodates heterogeneity in this case by allowing for responses
to local demand shocks but without intensifying competition (since, for a retailer,
there is always a 50% chance of selling to the high value consumer and if there is
a low cost consumer then the relevant retailer will want to sell to him and does
so). Hence, here, MAP can increase the scope for collusion relative to no vertical
arrangements or, indeed, relative to RPM.
In what follows we embed this logic in a formal model that builds on the Jullien
and Rey (2007) framework. The modeling objective is to allow price advertising to
have an explicit role in the market, while retaining tractability and enriching the
economic forces illustrated in Jullien and Rey (2007). The resulting framework is
one in which RPM facilitates a more stable cartel (in the sense of admitting collusion
for a wider range of discount rates than a cartel without restraints), at the cost of
flexibility. MAP, by contrast, can facilitate a yet more stable cartel, and does not
sacrifice flexibility, leading to higher cartel profits.
54Note that this also implies that each manufacturer would rather sell with certainty at a price l
than sell at a price of h with probability (1/2).
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4.1 Model details
There are two manufacturers, each of whom distributes to the local market via a
dedicated (non-shared) retailer; that is there is an M1 that sells through R1 and
an M2 that sells through R2. In this section, as in Section 2.1, we suppose that
consumers have unit demand. However, instead of assuming that the two goods are
homogeneous, we suppose that consumers value retailer Rj’s good at v + ξj, where
ξj ∼ U [0, 1] is a manufacturer-retailer specific demand shock reflecting idiosyncratic
local market factors. It follows that consumers will choose to visit retailer Rj if
v + ξj − E
(
pj|paj
) ≥ 0 (13)
and




> v − ξk − E (pk|pak) , (14)




is the expectation of the retail price,
conditional on the advertised price.55
The first inequality requires that the consumer must expect non-negative surplus,
and the second that the consumer expects greater surplus from visiting Rj than Rk.
If the first inequality holds and the second condition holds with equality, then we
suppose that the consumer purchases from whichever retailer offers a higher ξ. To
keep exposition simple, σ = 0 so consumers visit at most only one store (search costs
are high).
Furthermore, we suppose that ξj is not observed by any manufacturer nor by the
rival retailer; it is only privately observed by Rj after contracting with the manu-
facturer and before setting the retail price. Each manufacturer sells to its dedicated
retailer using a two-part tariff {wj, Tj} (which is not publicly observed).56 Lastly,
v > 1, which ensures that wj is always set such that all ξj realizations are served.
Advertised prices are observed by all—including rival manufacturers.
Timing within a stage is otherwise as in Section 2.1.1. There is an infinite rep-
etition of such stages where manufacturers discount the future at a common rate δ
and retailers and consumers are myopic in their behavior.




= pj . With a MAP restraint, this expectation
will be a determined by the equilibrium described in section 4.4.
56These assumptions reflect those in Julien and Rey (2007). The assumptions on ξj give a reason
to give some pricing discretion to the retailer. The assumptions on {wj , Tj} make the cartel’s
monitoring of compliance non-trivial (and keeps IR constraints relatively simple).
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4.2 Collusion with no vertical restrictions
With no vertical restraints, deriving the equilibrium of this game is somewhat in-
volved. Here we sketch the elements, and provide a characterization that is fleshed
out in the appendix. Once characterized, collusion in the absence of vertical re-
straints provides a benchmark against which to compare the much simpler RPM-
and MAP-facilitated schemes.
We begin by presenting a preliminary result that will prove useful. Specifically,
we begin by examining the pricing game between retailers, supposing (as will turn
out to be the case in equilibrium) that manufacturers choose the same input price;
that is, supposing that w1 = w2 = w. In this case, the pricing game between retailers
is a minor variant on the standard IPV symmetric first price sealed bid auction in
which each retailer solves:
pj = arg max
w≤p≤v+ξj
(p− w) Pr (ξj − p > ξk − pk) (15)
Equilibrium pricing is stated in Proposition 6 and derived following the steps in, for
instance, Krishna (2002).
Proposition 6 Assume that wj = wk = w. In a monotone perfect Bayesian equi-






Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 6 means that if w = 0, as would arise in the static version of the
game, then retailers price using the rule pj =
ξj
2
. That is, prices fluctuate by half
the actual fluctuations in local demand. The retailers’ expected profit, which is then




, which is 1
6
.57
Instead, the manufacturer-optimal scheme in this setting involves both manufac-
turers setting w = v and T = 1
6
. That is, the manufacturers set w as high as possible
without excluding any consumers,58 and then retailers compete accounting for id-
iosyncratic market conditions.59 The manufacturers extract the remaining expected
surplus from retailers using the lump sum component of the two part tariff.
In a collusive outcome, this scheme is enforced using a variant of a grim trigger
strategy, in which manufacturers set wt = v if all past advertised pricing has been in




2 Pr(ξj > ξk)dξj .
58This follows from the assumption that v > 1.
59We assume retailers are not parties to the cartel agreement and always play statically optimal
equilibrium strategies.
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the interval [v, v + 1
2
], and wt = 0 otherwise. This results in an expected per period




. The characterization is complicated
by the fact that determining the optimal deviation is not immediate. In particular, if
a manufacturer charges a slightly lower wholesale price in some period t, because of
the local demand ξj demand variations, this may lead to only a marginal gain but will
have only a marginal probability of detection. Alternatively, a manufacturer might
prefer a more drastic deviation that leads to a substantive gain albeit at the cost
of a higher probability of detection. These two forms of deviation can, in principle,
lead to two locally optimal deviations, which then need to be compared. Full details
appear in the appendix.60 The following proposition provides the lower bound on the
discount factor, δ, required for this collusive scheme to be supportable in equilibrium.





] for all j in all past periods, and wt = 0 otherwise, is supportable if δ >
6v−2
9v−2 .






Proof. See the appendix.
4.3 Collusion with RPM
When RPM is available, the manufacturers can set the price at which the retailers
sell to customers. As discussed in Section 2.1, this will also be the advertised price.
The value of RPM is that it removes any uncertainty on the part of the cartel
members as to whether there has been a deviation or not, albeit at the expense of
losing some flexibility in adjusting to local market conditions (that is, adjusting for ξj
realizations). Thus, collusion can now take the form: Set wt = p
RPM = v if the same
advertised pricing has been observed in all past periods, and wt = 0 otherwise.
61
Proposition 8 describes this much simpler, collusive environment.
Proposition 8 A collusive equilibrium in which manufacturers set wt = p
RPM
t = v
as long as paj,t = v for all j in all past periods, and wt = 0 otherwise, is supportable
if δ ≥ δRPM = 3v
6v−1 . In such an equilibrium, the per period profit earned by each




60Jullien and Rey’s central proof is aimed at eliminating exactly the same types of deviations in
their setting.
61An alternative punishment phase may involve using RPM and setting wt = p
RPM = 0. This
is a more extreme form of punishment. With this punishment stage equilibrium, pip = 0 in the
notation of the proof of Proposition 8. Thus, in Proposition 8, the threshold would adjust to δ > 12 .
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Proof. The proof is standard. It involves solving for δ such that
picRPM
1−δ ≥ piDRPM +
δ
1−δpi
p, where picRPM =
v
2




4.4 Collusion with MAP
Collusion, facilitated by MAP, involves coordinating on the advertised price, but al-
lowing the transaction price (as usual under MAP) to only be constrained to be less
than or equal to that advertised price. The value of this to the colluding manufactur-
ers is that it obfuscates pricing in the market for consumers, effectively introducing
a form of market division, while retaining flexibility on the part of consumers to
adjust prices to local idiosyncratic conditions; that is it is a scheme that partially
accommodates the realized demand heterogeneity. In this environment, the optimal
collusive strategy is to set paj,t = p
a
k,t = v + 1, resulting in the market being split
equally. Retailers, having retained the flexibility to adjust prices downward, now are
free from competition and can extract all consumer surplus by setting pj,t = v + ξj,t




the MAP provision, in this environment allows the retailer to extract all available
surplus from consumers they service (assuming a rationing rule in which consumers
purchase the good for which they have the highest value, given their indifference be-
tween goods after expected pricing is taken into account).62 Proposition 9 formalizes
this intuition.
The proposition supposes that if the cartel agreement breaks down, the manu-
facturers revert to play the static equilibrium policies.63
Proposition 9 A collusive equilibrium in which manufacturers enforce pMAPj,t = v+1
as long as paj,t = v+1 for all j in all past periods, and wt = 0 without MAP otherwise,
is supportable if δ ≥ δMAP = 1
2
. In such an equilibrium, the per period profit earned






Proof. The proof is standard, requiring solving for δ such that
piCMAP






, piDMAP = v +
1
2
and pip = 1
6
.
62In any other rationing rule, the surplus extraction is inefficient, in that by retarding competition,
consumers are not directed toward those products that maximize gains from trade. In the case where
consumers who are indifferent are equally likely to visit either firm, the corresponding expressions





MAP = 6v+312v+4 .
63An alternative punishment phase may still involve using MAP and setting w = pMAP = 0.
This is a more extreme form of punishment. With this punishment stage equilibrium, pip = 0. In
this case, Proposition 9 would instead require δ > 12 .
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4.5 Vertical restraints can facilitate collusion
A comparison of Propositions 7, 8 and 9 makes it clear that the collusive profits
with MAP dominate those without restrictions, which in turn dominate those from





Further, employing a vertical restraint (whether MAP or RPM) for the cartel
can increase stability, in the sense that the force of future retribution for a deviation
coupled with the prospect of losing collusive gains becomes a stronger incentive rela-
tive to the gains from deviating. This increase in the strength of dynamic incentives
is captured by comparing the lower bound of the range of discount factors under
which collusion can be supported. It can be easily verified that for v high enough (a







9v−2) a cartel can be more easily
sustained with RPM than with no restraints. MAP, by contrast, increases stability
relative to no restraints for a wider range (or, indeed, relative to RPM). This fol-
lows as it is easier to monitor a manufacturer deviation from the cartel arrangement,
when this arrangement involves a vertical restraint. When v is low then an RPM
arrangement may be sacrificing too much in terms of profits, just as in Jullien and
Rey (2007), and the flexibility to respond to local demand conditions is relatively
valuable. MAP, on the other hand, maintains flexibility and so does not demand the
same trade-off.
Finally, as mentioned above, δMAP < δRPM suggesting that MAP policies may
help in stabilizing cartel agreements relative to RPM in addition to providing higher
cartel profits.64 This follows since, although in both arrangements it is equally easy
to monitor deviations from the cartel agreements, the MAP arrangement allows for
a higher cartel profit since it accommodates the heterogeneity associated with local
demand variation.
Thus MAP policies can allow a manufacturers’ cartel to attain greater surplus
extraction than a cartel that does not use MAP or RPM, and strengthen the dynamic
incentives that give the cartel stability, such that it is at least as stable as RPM.
As such, in this setting with search frictions, MAP appears a more effective cartel
facilitation device that RPM.
5 Discussion
This paper has discussed both pro- and anti-competitive features of MAP policies.
MAP policies are distinct from RPM in that they can serve as a more effective way
64As already noted above, in Footnotes 59 and 61, if MAP or RPM is used in the punishment
stage, then δMAP = δRPM .
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to incentivize service, and as a more effective way to facilitate collusion. As such
it suggests that, to the extent that controversy surrounds the appropriate policy
treatment of vertical price restraints, the same, or greater, controversy should sur-
round vertical information restraints, of which MAP is a prominent example. At the
very least, carefully considering the nature and impact of information constraints in
markets where search is a central feature seems warranted.
Of course, another way of restraining information is a ban on retail price adver-
tising. This may be an interesting restriction in its own right. Formally, in the MAP
as price discrimination discussion of Section 2, such a ban on advertising would lead
to equivalent retail pricing decisions and economic outcomes. Similarly, in the case
of upstream collusion in Section 4, a ban on price advertising would lead retailers to
charge their monopoly prices (which manufacturers can extract through fixed fees)
leading to similar profits and conditions to sustain a collusive agreement to ban price
advertising. In richer environments with downward-sloping demand rather than unit
demand, as in Section 3, the level of the advertising restriction can be used to affect
the double marginalization concern raised by Spengler (1950) in addition to the other
considerations outlined. Further in the presence of additional upstream and retail
(imperfect) competitors, advertising directed at inter-brand competition would still
be valuable and would lead the “monopoly” prices we focus on to be interpreted
as best responses to such competitors’ strategies. By contrast, when faced with an
advertising ban and sufficiently high search costs (still retaining inter-brand com-
petition), retailers could not commit to charge anything other than their monopoly
price.65 Thus, a MAP policy can allow a manufacturer to reassure consumers that
they will not suffer this kind of hold-up, and as a consequence help the manufacturer
in engaging in inter-brand competition.
This paper leaves at least three areas of enquiry open. First, aside from the collu-
sion model, the frameworks presented here do not consider the impact of competition
at the manufacturer level. Given that information restraints will likely change the
cross-price elasticities between competitors, even absent collusion, this seems a rich
area for further investigation.
Second, the models presented here limit the role of advertising to pure price adver-
tising. This is analytically helpful in creating a clear mapping between the advertised
price and the transaction price, but suppresses aspects that may be important in a
richer model. An obvious issue in the price discrimination and collusion models is
that unit demand means that prices do not influence quantities to the extent they
might in a real market. A more delicate, and interesting, issue is that advertised
65Note advertising is a way to commit to not do this, due to the requirement that price be at or
below the advertised price.
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prices may signal quality—an issue that is claimed to be a concern in some MAP
policy statements.
Lastly, the extent to which MAP, like other vertical restraints, can generate
exclusion of a rival is not explicitly investigated, although it is conjectured that, as
elsewhere, this effect can be generated.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 2 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium pricing strategy such
that, for j ∈ {1, 2}:
1. if cj = cH , pH = w + cH
2. if cj = 0, price (pL) is drawn from the distribution FL(p) =
(p−w)q(p)−α(p−w)q(p)
(1−α)(p−w)q(p)
with the support [p, p) , where p = min{pH , pML (w)} and pML is the monopoly
price a low cost retailer would charge; i.e. pML = arg max(p− w)q(p); and p is
implicitly defined by q(p)
(
p− w) = α(p− w)q(p).
Proof. By standard Bertrand reasoning, if cj = cH then pi(pH) = 0. This implies
pH = cH + w.
For cj = 0, the equilibrium price distribution resembles that in Stahl (1989). The
maximal price is the minimum of the monopoly price given w and cj = 0, denoted
pML (w), and cH + w − ε such that ε −→ 0. That is, if pML (w) ≥ cH + w then the
maximal price of the price distribution will be arbitrarily close to cH + w. Hence, if
pML (w) ≥ cH + w, p = cH + w. Otherwise p = pML (w).
Since a mixed strategy requires that α(p−w)q(p) = [α + (1− α) (1− FL(p))] (p−
w)q(p) for all p in the support, it follows that FL(p) =
(p−w)q(p)−α(p−w)q(p)
(1−α)(p−w)q(p) .
The lower bound of the support is found by setting FL(p) = 0.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the minimum RPM price is P < w+ cH (so that it
does not bind given a high cost realization) but binds given the low cost realization,
there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium pricing strategy such that for j ∈ {1, 2}:
1. if cj = cH , pH = w + cH ;
2. if cj = 0, and pmin < pmin then price, pL, is drawn from the distribution
FminP (p) with support P ∪ (pmin, pmin) and an atom at P where
(a) p < pmin, FminP (p) is characterized by α(pmin − w)q(pmin) = q(p)(p −
w)(α + (1− α)(1− FminP (p))
(b) p
min
is implicitly defined by q(P )(P − w)
[
α + (1− α)FminP (pmin)
2








3. if cj = 0, and pmin ≥ pmin then pL = P with probability 1.
Proof. The logic is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.
That there must be a mass point at P follows from the fact that it binds. Bertrand
reasoning determines the behavior of retailers with high cost realization.
Indifference (so that profits are the same at all prices that a low cost retailer
chooses in the pricing equilibrium) determines both properties 3 and 5.
Proposition 6 Assume that wj = wk = w. In a monotone perfect Bayesian






Proof. The proof follows the proof of equilibrium in a IPV symmetric first price
seal bid auction. See Krishna (2002) p.16ff for omitted details, easily adapted to this
setting. The retailers solve
pj(ξj) = arg max
w≤p≤v+ξj
(p− w) Pr (ξj − p > ξk − pk) (16)
Let uk(ξk) = ξk− pk(ξk) and denote the equilibrium strategy to be βk(ξ) = u(ξj),
and β−1(uk) = ξk. Assume that this strategy is monotone and increasing. To begin
assume that w ≤ v. Recall that ξ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The retailers’
problem is then:
pj = arg max
p
(p− w) β−1(ξj − p) (17)
First order conditions yield
β−1(ξj − p)− (p− w) ∂β
−1(ξj − p)
∂(ξj − p) = 0 (18)
Imposing the equilibrium condition that β(ξj) = u(ξ), yields
ξj − (p(ξj)− w) 1
1− p′(ξ) = 0 (19)
p(ξ) + p′(ξ)ξ = ξ + w (20)
∂
∂ξ
(p(ξ)ξ) = ξ + w (21)
p(ξ)ξ =
∫
(ξ + w)dξ (22)






It remains to deal with the case where w ≥ v. In this case, some measure of ξ
are excluded. The measure of included realizations is now U [w − v, 1]. This implies
that the boundary condition is now u(w − v) = 0, yielding the pricing part of the
proposition. That paj = pj follows from Lemma 1.
Proposition 7 A collusive equilibrium in which manufacturers set wt = v if
paj ∈ [v, v + 12 ] for all j in all past periods, and wt = 0 otherwise, is supportable if
δ > 6v−2







Proof. There are three possible deviations. The first is w ∈ [0, v − 1], denoted D1.
The second is w ∈ (v − 1, v − 1
2
)






Given these three types of deviation, there are three conditions that are necessary
for collusion to be able to be sustained. These are:
picNR
1− δ ≥ pi











1− δ ≥ pi











1− δ ≥ pi















; and in case the collusion breaks down, manufacturers earn the
one-shot profit which is denoted by pip = 1
6
.
Note that it is immediate that deviating to w > v cannot be optimal.
The proof proceeds by establishing properties of the optimal deviation of each
type, first by characterizing the retailers pricing when wj < wk = v and then exam-
ining the manufacturers problem in setting wj for each type of deviation. Finally, a
δ that is sufficient for none of the deviations to be attractive is derived.
First, consider the pricing of a retailer with a wholesale unit price of wj facing a





p∗j(ξj) = arg max
p
(p− wj) Pr(ξj − p > ξk − v − ξk
2
) (27)
66Recall that retailers are not part of any cartel agreement and compete in a static game.
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Given that ξk is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], this amounts to maximizing
(p− w) (2ξj + 2v − 2p) (28)
in the region where (2ξj + 2v − 2p) ∈ [0, 1] (outside of this region, either there is
no chance of winning, or the retailer wins for certain and is merely forgoing revenue






. If 2ξj + 2v− 2p∗ > 1, then the pricing rule is p = v− 12 + ξj.67 Further, if
2ξj+2v−2p∗(ξj) > 1, then the same inequality holds for all ξ > ξj. This results in the












Next we turn to consider the manufacturer’s strategy. The first style of deviation
(D1), involves choosing the optimal deviation in the interval w ∈ [0, v − 1]. In this
interval, by inspection of the retailer’s pricing rule derived above, the probability of
detection is equal to 0.5 regardless of w. Hence, the optimal deviation can be derived
by maximizing the combined retailer-manufacturer-pair deviation payoff (since the
manufacturer can extract the retailer’s profit through the fixed fee). It is clear that
this is exactly what the retailer will do when wj = 0. Hence, the profit maximizing
D1 deviation arises when the retailer sets prices such that pj = v− 12 + ξj. From the
manufacturers point of view, this retailer pricing policy will arise for any w ∈ [0, v−1]
and so can be implemented in a variety of ways, all resulting in the same deviation
profit of v (the lump-sum component of the manufacturer’s two part tariff will be
used to extract remaining expected profits from the retailer). Thus the D1 deviation
yields piD1 = v and Pr(pj < v|wD1) = 12 .
Given this, we can solve for the minimum δ such that a D1 deviation is not




























implying that when δ ≥ 6v−2
9v−2 a D1 deviation is not attractive.
The second style of deviation (D2), leaves the probability of detection unchanged
at 0.5. To see this note that for all w ∈ (v − 1, v − 1
2
)












v when ξ = 1
2
and that p is monotonic in ξ and so the deviation is detected for
ξ ≤ 1
2
and undetected otherwise. Also, recall that when w = 0 the retailer chooses
pj = v − 12 + ξj. Hence, by setting w ∈
(
v − 1, v − 1
2
)
, the manufacturer diminishes
stage profits, with no compensating return in terms of adjusting the probability
67Recall, v > 1, making this event relevant. In this event, the pricing rule is derived by raising p
until the chance of winning is equal to 1.
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around detection (that is, leaving the continuation value unchanged). Hence, a D2
deviation must always be dominated by a D1 deviation.
The third style of deviation (D3), involves choosing the optimal deviation in the




. In this interval, a change in w will affect the probability of
detection; specifically, in this range, Pr(pj < v|w) = Pr(v+w2 + ξj2 < v) = Pr(ξj <
v − w) = v − w. Trivially, dPr(pj<v|wj)
dwj






= v − 1
2




















It will be useful to note that ∂pi
D3
∂wj
= −wj (wj + 1− v) and that equation (30) also
describes piD2.





piD3 + Pr(pj < v|wj) δ
1− δpi
















NR − pip) (32)





where the last equality follows on substituting for the two derivatives, as calculated
above. Note that the second derivative is
∂2D3(wj)
∂w2j
= v − 1 − 2wj < 0 in the range
w ∈ [v − 1
2
, v).




























< 0 implies δ < 2
3
. Hence, for a D3 deviation to exist it must be






It remains to establish that a D1 deviation will always dominate a D3 deviation.
It is established above that the optimal D1 deviation can be implemented by setting
w = v − 1. In the region w ∈ (v − 1, v − 1
2
)
(a D2 deviation), deviation profits,
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−wj (wj + 1− v) for a D3 deviation to dominate a D1 deviation it must be that∫ wD3
v−1








dw > 0 (34)
where wD3 is the optimal w for a D3 deviation. Note that, on the assumption that
equation (34) is true,∫ wD3
v−1



















































Where the first inequality arises from noting that ∂
2D3(w)
∂w2






. The second inequality comes from noting that the second and third
integrals are linear in w, and so their difference, under the maintained assumption,
is increasing in the limits of integration. Setting, δ = 2v+2
3v+2
(to maximize the third


















which, by contradiction, establishes that D1 is the more profitable deviation.
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Appendix B: Additional material: Not for publica-
tion
Strategic Consumers and Advertising
In the text, we do not allow consumers to be strategic, but simply suppose that high-
search cost consumers choose to purchase from the retailer with the lowest advertised
price, unless prices are the same in which case they randomize. In this appendix, we
argue that such such behavior is an equilibrium of a game that allows for strategic
consumers that engage in reasoning consistent with a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Specifically, a retailer’s advertised retail price is denoted paj . We assume that this
is flexible, and so paj is set contemporaneously with the retailers’ transaction price.
We make the following assumption. It ensures that the advertised price is not simply
cheap talk.
A1. Advertising cannot be fraudulent in the following sense: the advertising price
can be no lower than the retail transaction price pj, i.e. p
a
j ≥ pj.
In all other respects we keep the game form the same as in Section 2.1. Given
that some consumers can visit only a single retailer, beliefs as to pj given p
a
j need to
be considered. This results in the relevant equilibrium concept being (a refinement
of) perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
In principle, there is considerable flexibility in assigning off-equilibrium beliefs
and, thereby, inducing perverse equilibrium behavior. However, Assumption A1
specifies that a retailer cannot advertise a price below the price that it charges
imposes real constraints. For example, suppose that a retailer charging a price of $4
or charging a price of $6 were expected to advertise the same price. The advertised
price would have to be a price at or above $6 to conform with this restriction.
Suppose that this advertised price is $20 and that these are the only two kinds
of retailer expected to advertise at $20 in equilibrium. Then consumers expect on
average some price above $4 (if it was equally likely that retailers charge $4 and
$6, consumers anticipate $5 on average).68 Suppose that the retailer charging $4
instead of advertising a price of $20 advertises a price of $4. Given the restriction
that retailers cannot advertise at prices below what they charge, it must be that
consumers even if this is an off-equilibrium advertised price anticipate paying a price
68Recall that retailers are indistinguishable to consumers, so that if paj = p
a
k then E(pj |paj ) =
E(pk|pak).
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at or below $4; it follows that this advertised price attracts more consumers, as their
expected surplus must be strictly greater, and hence would be more profitable.69
When there are no advertising restrictions, the simple logic in the example above
has considerable bite. The underlying point is that for every advertised price arising
in equilibrium there is a unique retail transaction price. This creates advertised prices
that are unambiguous, and are equivalent to requiring that retailers will advertise
the price that they actually charge.70 The following result makes this precise for
pure strategy equilibria.71
Proposition 10 Suppose that there are no advertising restrictions. Then in any
(pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibrium, on the equilibrium path, each pa maps
to a unique p.
Proof. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that there is an equilibrium where this is
not the case. Then the equilibrium must involve (at least) two retailers, who charge
different transaction prices, choosing the same advertised price a. The other possi-
bility is that one retailer sets the same advertised price for two different transaction
prices, but this is ruled out by virtue of each retailer being able to set only one price.
First, it must be that all retailers advertising at a get some customers. If not, then
they can always set their advertised price equal to a level that does get customers
and still make a profit, since the manufacturer cannot discriminate at the wholesale
level.
Now consider all retailers who advertise at a. Of this set, let pmin(a) denote
the price of the retailer with the lowest actual price. Note that since there is more
than one retailer who advertises at a, it must be the case that consumers anticipate
a non-zero probability of an actual price strictly greater than pmin(a), and hence
expect surplus smaller than that generated by receiving pmin(a) with certainty.
72
Further, for all retailers that advertise at a, high search cost consumers randomize
over these retailers.
69If, in equilibrium, competing retailers advertise and charge a price of $6, but the retailer of
interest has an actual price of $4, any advertised price in the interval [4, 6) is considered equivalent
to advertising a price of $4.
70Two mappings from advertised prices to transaction prices are equivalent if changing the set
of prices from which advertised prices can be drawn makes no difference to the realized transaction
prices or consummated transactions. That is, the language does not matter so long as the message
is the same.
71The result can easily be extended to mixed strategy equilibria, albeit with much more notation.
72Recall that, from the point of view of consumers, retailers are identical (aside from their ad-
vertised prices). Hence, consumers cannot condition their expectations of pj on j.
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The restriction that a retailer cannot charge a price higher than its advertised
price implies that, if the retailer charging pmin(a) advertised its actual price pmin(a),
consumers could not put any probability on the retailer charging a higher price
than pmin(a) (and might even put some probability on a lower price). That is they
anticipate an actual price that is equal to, or lower than pmin(a). Expected surplus
is similarly strictly increased.
Putting together the observations in each of the three paragraphs above, it is
immediate that setting the advertised price at pmin(a) would attract strictly greater
demand as compared to choosing the advertised price a. This generates the required
contradiction.
In particular, trivially, with no advertising restrictions, there is no loss in suppos-
ing that equilibria will have the intuitive property that consumer beliefs are monotone
in the following sense.
Definition 1 Consumers’ beliefs are monotone if, ∀paj > p̂aj , E(pj|paj ) > E(pj|p̂aj ).
Definition 2 A monotone perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which consumers’ beliefs are monotone.
In case of advertising restrictions, a retailer may not be able to set the advertised
price equal to its actual price. Moreover, when the MAP price is high, the logic in the
example above that underlies Proposition 10 can have little bite. Returning to the
example above, suppose that there was a MAP price of $10, and consumers expected
that retailers advertising a price of $20 were equally likely to actually charge $4 or
$12, supported by the (off-equilibrium) beliefs that any retailer advertising anything
between $10 and $20 actually charged $9. Here, since the MAP restriction prevents
the retailer charging $4 from advertising at a sufficiently low price, this retailer has
little to gain from advertising at a price below $20 and differentiating itself from the
retailer charging $12. A focus on monotone perfect Bayesian equilibrium rules out
such perverse outcomes. Restricting equilibrium to requiring monotone beliefs leads
retailers to advertise at as low as a price as possible. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 11 In a MAP regime, in all monotone perfect Bayesian equilibria, each
retailer advertises its actual price unless the MAP restriction binds, and in this case





In the paper we assume that firms advertise a price paj = pj, or, if a MAP re-




. In this appendix, in the absence of fraudulent
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advertising (that is under Assumption A1) we have shown that doing so can cap-
ture all the economic richness that a richer strategy space would deliver with only
minimal (reasonable) restrictions on the set from which consumer beliefs are drawn.
Further, these restrictions are only required when MAP policies bind.
Additional Material for Section 3
Section 3.2: The manufacturer’s problem with RPM
As described in the text, RPM can only play a role in inducing service provision in
one of two cases (i) either it binds for both low and high cost realizations; that is,
if P > w + cH ; or (ii) it leads a firm with a low cost realization to choose P with
certainty (which requires p
min
> pmin as defined in Proposition 3). In the latter case,
it is immediate that a firm with a high cost realization makes no investment, and
the level of the investment of a firm with a low cost realization satisfies:
I ′(sL(P )) =
(
α +
(1− α)(1− sL(P ))
2
)
(P − w)q(P ); (39)
the manufacturer sets T equal to the retailer’s expected profits
T = (1− α)
[(
αsL +
(1− α)(1− (1− sL)2)
2
)
(P − w)q(P )− I(sL)
]
, (40)
and w to maximize expected profits
2T + wq(P )
[
2α(1− α)sL + (1− α)2(1− (1− sL)2)
]
+ wα2q(w + cH). (41)
In the former case, where both high and low cost firms set a price equal to




for low cost and high cost realization can be easily implicitly characterized through
the first order conditions described in the main text in (10) and (9). Finally, we can




(P − w − c)q(P )
2





(P − w)q(P )
2
(1− (1− sL)(1− αsH − (1− α)sL)− I(sL)
]
,
and chooses w and P > w + cH to maximize
2T+wq(P )
[





Section 3.3: The manufacturer’s problem with MAP
The manufacturer set T as follows
T = α
[
(P − w − c)q(P )
2








(1− (1− sL)(1− αsH − (1− α)sL)− I(sL)
]
,
and chooses w and P > w + cH to maximize expected profits—the sum of the fixed
fee T and expected revenue from the per unit fee:
2T + w
[
α2(1− (1− sH)2)q(P ) + (1− α)2(1− (1− sL)2)q(pm(w))
+α(1− α)(1− (1− sL)(1− sH))(q(P ) + q(pm(w)))
]
. (45)
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